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THE RIPPLE EFFECTS OF GIDEON: RECOGNIZING THE
HUMAN RIGHT TO LEGAL COUNSEL IN CIVIL
ADVERSARIAL PROCEEDINGS

Jonathan K. Stubbs*
“[L]et justice roll down like waters, and righteousness like an
ever-flowing stream.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
A little over fifty-five years ago, the Supreme Court of the United
States decided Gideon v. Wainwright.2 The essence of Gideon’s
reasoning was that in criminal cases, indigent defendants were entitled
to justice. The Gideon Court acknowledged:
From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and
laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive
safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in
which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal
cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face
his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.3

The Court recognized that justice—that is, procedural fairness and
equal treatment—required due process and equal protection for all.
Gideon’s justice rationale includes two interrelated concerns. First,
as the Court put it, “fair trials before impartial tribunals”4 (that is,
procedural fairness or due process). Gideon’s second and related

© 2020, Jonathan K. Stubbs. All rights reserved. Professor of Law, University of Richmond
School of Law. M.T.S., Harvard University, 1990; LL.M., Harvard University, 1979; J.D., Yale
University, 1978; B.A., Oxford University, 1976; B.A., Haverford College, 1974.
1. Amos 5:24 (New Revised Standard Version).
2. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3. Id. at 344 (emphasis added).
4. Id.
*
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requirement was that “every defendant stand[] equal before the law.”5
In other words, justice entails equal treatment or equal protection for
all. Procedural fairness and equal treatment are intertwined concepts.
Both are central to realizing justice. They are embedded in the Due
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as well as the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This Article contends that procedural fairness and equal
protection require legal assistance of counsel for indigent civil litigants,
especially in adversarial proceedings. As United States District Judge
Robert Sweet argued in a speech to the New York Bar Association:
“[W]e need a civil Gideon, that is, an expanded constitutional right to
counsel in civil matters. Lawyers, and lawyers for all, are essential to
the functioning of an effective justice system.”6
Part II of this Article briefly recapitulates the facts and reasoning
in Gideon’s case. To illuminate constitutional bases for recognizing a
civil right to counsel, Part II revisits McCulloch v. Maryland7 because
McCulloch articulates widely accepted American constitutional law
interpretive approaches. In addition, Part II outlines several tools in
McCulloch’s tool kit and applies them to the constitutional foundations
for a civil Gideon—namely: the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution.
Furthermore, regarding the scope of the right to counsel in civil
cases, Part II critiques the 2011 Roberts Court’s overly restrictive
decision in Turner v. Rogers.8 Nevertheless, in light of Turner, the
Article acknowledges the probable futility of initiating federal
constitutional litigation to elucidate the broad parameters of indigent
persons’ human right to counsel—including legal counsel in civil
proceedings. In fact, in light of the composition of the current Supreme
Court, bringing such litigation now would likely be extremely
counterproductive.
Given these practical constraints, Part III of the Article affirms the
need for legislation to address the massive shortfall in legal
5. Id.
6. ABA Resolution 112A, Report to the House of Delegates at 7 (Aug. 7, 2006),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/
ls_sclaid_06A112A.authcheckdam.pdf (quoting Robert W. Sweet, Civil “Gideon” and Justice in the
Trial Court (The Rabbi’s Beard), 52 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 915, 924 (1997)) [hereinafter ABA
Resolution 112A].
7. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
8. 564 U.S. 431, 449 (2011).
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representation available to indigent persons in the United States.9
Specifically, this Part outlines and endorses provisions of ABA
Resolution 112A—unanimously adopted by the ABA House of
Delegates in 2006—urging federal, state, and territorial governments
to provide legal counsel as a matter of right at public expense to lowincome persons in those categories of adversarial proceedings where
basic human needs are at stake, such as those involving shelter,
sustenance, safety, health, or child custody, as determined by each
jurisdiction.10
In addition, Part III builds upon the theoretical argument outlined
in Part II, by contending that the Framers of the Constitution of 1787
intended to protect human liberty on the basis of fairness and equality
as evidenced by the words of the Declaration of Independence:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty,
and the pursuit of Happiness. That, to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just
powers from the consent of the governed.11
Thus, the Declaration literally states that the United States was
established to secure liberty and equality for all.
Of course, the question arises, what did the Framers mean when
they said that “all men are created equal”?12 Did the Framers simply
mean that all males like themselves were created equal? Did the
Framers have a broader audience in mind? After all, evidence exists
that, in practice, the Framers failed to live up to the Declaration’s
professed ethic of universal freedom and equality.13 Thus, Professors
Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry contend that:
Eighteenth-century Americans meant many things by the
term “equality.” With Locke, they believed men were born
9. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, The Justice Gap: Measuring the Unmet Civil Legal Needs of
Low-Income Americans, June 2017, at 6, https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/images/
TheJusticeGap-Full Report.pdf [hereinafter Justice Gap Report]; ABA Resolution 112A, supra note
6.
10. ABA Resolution 112A, supra note 6, at 1.
11. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (1776).
12. See id.
13. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 14 (1990).
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equal because, in the most basic sense, none had any superior
claim to rule over others. Despite its apparent breadth, this
eighteenth-century egalitarianism was extremely limited. It
did not lead many Americans to conclude that slavery was
wrong. Nor did most American republicans extend equality to
those who did not participate in the political process,
including women, Indians, children, and—in some places at
some times—those who lacked property qualifications for
voting.14
On March 31, 1776, in a perceptive letter Abigail Adams wrote to
her husband (and future president) John Adams stating among other
things:
I long to hear that you have declared an independency -- and by the
way in the new Code of Laws which I suppose it will be necessary
for you to make I desire you would Remember the Ladies, and be
more generous and favourable to them than your ancestors. Do not
put such unlimited power into the hands of the Husbands.
Remember all Men would be tyrants if they could. If perticuliar [sic]
care and attention is not paid to the Laidies [sic] we are determined
to foment a Rebelion [sic], and will not hold ourselves bound by any
Laws in which we have no voice, or Representation.15

In short, a strong argument exists that the Framers’ deeds were
hypocritical. Moreover, the hypocrisy argument has support in the text
of the Constitution, which among other things provided for importation
of slaves and indentured servants until 180816 and effectively limited
the franchise to males.17
14. Id.; see also 1 SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE:
PREHISTORY TO 1789 at 295 (1972) (“Did Jefferson think of blacks when he wrote, ‘All men are
created equal’? His subsequent career indicates that he did not; that in his view Negroes were not
‘men.’”); PETER N. CAROLL & DAVID W. NOBLE, THE FREE AND THE UNFREE: A PROGRESSIVE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 114–15 (3d ed. 2001) (“The principles of revolution, Jefferson explained, did not
lurk in the intricate mysteries of constitutional law; they were not obscure or scholarly. Rather,
they were intuitive, within the capacity of most people, and they legitimated bold acts in defense
of ‘life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.’”).
15. Letter
from
Abigail
Adams
to
John
Adams,
2
(Mar.
31,
1776),
https://www.masshist.org/digitaladams/archive/doc?id=L17760331aa.
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (“The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the
States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to
the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such
Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.”).
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members
chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall
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If the hypocrisy argument is accurate, it suggests Framer duplicity.
However, one might argue that while in practice some Framers had a
limited vision of freedom and equality, at the very least, the Framers
implicitly expected that legal decision makers would be a privileged
class like themselves: upper-middle class and upper-class white
males.18 And that all such members of the privileged legal decisionmaking class would construe and apply the Constitution as the decision
makers would want the Constitution to be construed and applied to
themselves. In short, the Framers proceeded on the assumption that
undergirding American law and society would be the basic norm
commonly expressed as follows: “in everything do to others as you
would have them do to you.”19 The one caveat would be who
constituted the “others.” A strong argument exists that the Framers
embraced a not so Golden Rule which would require treating only a
privileged few as you would wish to be treated.
At least two responses are appropriate in response to this line of
attack. First, why not give the Framers the benefit of the doubt and
presume that they were acting in good faith? For instance, there were
abolitionists like Governeur Morris within the ranks of the
Constitution’s principal drafters who sought to achieve a wider vision
of liberty and equality.20 Indeed:
have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State
Legislature.”). Because the qualifications for holding office in the State Legislatures required in
nearly all states that a person be male, women were effectively excluded from voting in federal
elections.
18. See FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 13, at 14–15 (“The eighteenth-century republicans on
both sides of the Atlantic expected that a ‘natural aristocracy’ would spring up to govern the
country. Composed of those with extraordinary talent, the natural aristocracy would exemplify
both virtue and restraint. They would put the good of the community before their own selfish
interests and protect liberty from the selfishness of individuals and the corruption of governors.
At the same time, since they would derive their pre-eminent role from natural talents rather than
artificial distinctions, they would be in an ideal position to guide and govern the masses.”); Laura
A. Hernandez, When the Wise Latina Judge Meets A Living Constitution—Why It Is A Matter of
Perspective, 17 TEX. HISP. J. L. & POLICY 53, 97 (2011) (“The framers were white, male landowners
and as result, conferred all authority, such as the right to vote, to their brethren.”); Ann M.
Burkhart, The Constitutional Underpinnings of Homelessness, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 211, 240 (2003)
(“The question whether to hold the convention had not been put to a popular vote, and the
delegates were not chosen by the electorate, but by the state legislatures. Unsurprisingly,
therefore, the constitutional delegates were virtually all members of the upper classes, and many
had been born into their station in life. The uniformity of the Framers’ economic status had a
predictable impact on the Constitution.”) (footnotes omitted).
19. Matthew 7:12 (New International Version).
20. WILLIAM HOWARD ADAMS, GOUVERNEUR MORRIS: AN INDEPENDENT LIFE xii (2003). During the
constitutional convention, as the delegates debated the role of slavery in the United States, Morris
stated:
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Fired with moral disgust, [Morris] foresaw more clearly than
anyone the catastrophic results of incorporating slavery into
the nation’s political fabric. When a number of the exhausted
delegates, including Hamilton, were prepared to give up and
abandon the whole experiment of building a nation, Morris
was ready to make the gamble that the people were, in the
words of his Preamble, prepared “to form a more perfect
union.”21
Morris’ work resulted in the Constitution’s Preamble: “We the
People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union,
establish Justice . . . and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and
our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United
States of America.”22
The Preamble encapsulates the Declaration’s essence—the
preservation of liberty for all. In light of these facts, it can be fairly
contended that the Framers wrote a Constitution which purported to
secure freedom and justice.
Secondly, the text of the Declaration itself is broad enough to
encompass recognition of freedom and equality for all (universal
justice). When the Declaration used the term “men” in the late
eighteenth century, “men” often referred to all humankind.23 An
important theme in this essay is that the Constitution must be
interpreted to achieve the Framers’ goals of universal freedom and
equality. That argument does not depend upon the flawed practical
behavior of the Framers (and those of us who follow their footsteps).
According to the Founders, America stands on the solid ethical and
legal rock of unalienable, God-given, universal rights of freedom and

The admission of slaves into the representation when fairly explained comes to this: that
the inhabitant of Georgia and South Carolina who goes to the coast of Africa and, in
defiance of the most sacred laws of humanity, tears away his fellow creatures from their
dearest connections and damns them to the most cruel bondages, shall have more votes in
a government instituted for the protection of the rights of mankind than the citizen of
Pennsylvania or New Jersey who views with a laudable horror so nefarious a practice.
RICHARD BROOKHISER, GENTLEMAN REVOLUTIONARY: GOUVERNEUR MORRIS, THE RAKE WHO WROTE THE
CONSTITUTION 85–86 (2003).
21. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. pmbl).
22. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
23. See Man, SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE,
https://johnsonsdictionaryonline.com/man-noun/ (last updated Jan. 5, 2013). The first definition
that Johnson attributes to man is “human being.” Id. That primary definition notwithstanding,
Johnson’s second definition of man is “not a woman.” Id.
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equality.24 The Framers created the Constitution to secure those rights.
In practical terms, universal freedom and equality depend upon
treating all others with respect—that is, as we wish to be treated.
Moreover, this more expansive vision of freedom and equality—
treating all others with respect—emerged from the Second American
Revolution. That Revolution was the American Civil War, which
resulted in the destruction of chattel slavery and the creation of a new,
amended American Constitution.25 Central to the new Constitution is
the Fourteenth Amendment, which specifies that every person in every
state in the United States is entitled to have legal protection for her
rights of Due Process and Equal Protection of the laws.26 The
Fourteenth Amendment, particularly its Equal Protection Clause, is an
explicit statement of an implicit premise—namely, that in the
interpretation and application of the laws, all persons are to be treated
as legal decision makers themselves would wish to be treated.
Moreover, ABA Resolution 112A exemplifies the Framers’
expressly articulated values of liberty and justice for all. The Resolution
spells out the ABA’s support for equitable access to justice for all
persons.27
In this context, Part IV of this Article advocates a paradigm shift to
accommodate a moral revolution. Recognition of a civil Gideon as part
of the Constitution’s promise of justice (procedural fairness and equal
treatment) exemplifies such a shift in consciousness—a consciousness
rippling beyond the scope of the law and encompassing interpersonal
relations. Such a revolution begins with individual humans. The
expansion of our individual worldviews comports with the urgent and
necessary practical work of constructively transforming law as well as
our society.

24. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (1776).
25. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION: 1863–1877 at 119–23
(1988) (discussing the Civil War, its impact on American society, and the limited steps towards
equality for African Americans during Reconstruction); 1 SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE: 1789–1877 (1972); see also FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 13, at
389–485 (reviewing the legislative history and other relevant matters relating to the adoption of
the Reconstruction Amendments as well as recognition of the right to vote for politically excluded
groups like women).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
27. ABA Resolution 112A, supra note 6, at 15–16.
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II. SOME CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR A CIVIL GIDEON
A. The Gideon Case
In Gideon v. Wainwright,28 defendant Clarence Earl Gideon was
accused of a felony, namely breaking and entering a pool room in
Florida while intending to commit a misdemeanor.29 Gideon requested
that the state court appoint a lawyer to represent him. The state court
denied his request and said that the court could only appoint lawyers
to represent criminal defendants in capital cases.30
At trial, Gideon represented himself by making an opening
statement, cross-examining witnesses, presenting witnesses, and in his
closing argument, emphasizing that he was innocent. The jury
convicted him, and Gideon was sentenced to a five-year prison term in
the state penitentiary.31
Subsequently, Gideon filed a writ of habeas corpus in the Florida
Supreme Court. The state supreme court denied Gideon’s petition for
relief.32 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Court
appointed a lawyer to represent Gideon.33 The Court also requested
that counsel for both sides argue whether the Court should reconsider
its holding in Betts v. Brady.34
The Gideon Court said that the facts of Betts were so similar to
those in Gideon that if Betts were correctly decided, Gideon’s claim
would fail.35 In analyzing Betts, the Gideon Court stated that the Court
accepted “Betts v. Brady’s assumption, based as it was on our prior
cases, that a provision of the Bill of Rights which is ‘fundamental and
essential to a fair trial’ is made obligatory upon the States by the
Fourteenth Amendment.”36 The Gideon Court ruled that “the Court in
Betts was wrong . . . in concluding that the Sixth Amendment’s
guarantee of counsel is not one of these fundamental rights.”37

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Id. at 336.
Id. at 337.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 338.
316 U.S. 455 (1942).
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339.
Id. at 342 (quoting Betts, 316 U.S. at 465).
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 342.

2020]

The Ripple Effects of Gideon

465

Writing for the Court’s majority, Justice Black said that “reason
and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system of
criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a
lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for
him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth.”38
While Gideon expressly relied on the Sixth Amendment as applied
to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Gideon also specifically noted that the Constitution seeks
to ensure that “every defendant stands equal before the law.”39 The
Court emphasized that “[t]his noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor
man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to
assist him.”40 Stated differently, the Court recognized that infused in
the right to counsel in criminal trials is an implicit equal protection
component. The Gideon Court did not elaborate upon the equal
protection basis for its holding. The Court simply outlined an equal
protection rationale as fundamental to its ruling. In criminal
proceedings, Gideon recognized that fairness and equality under the
law are interrelated, essential safeguards to protect individual liberty.
To be sure, Gideon dealt with the right to counsel in criminal
proceedings. The Court said nothing about the constitutional basis for a
right to counsel in civil proceedings. Accordingly, this Article considers
the question of whether anything in the Constitution expressly
excludes legal recognition and protection of a right to counsel in civil
cases. To answer that question, the Article now turns to an analysis of
relevant provisions of the United States Constitution.
B. Constitutional Pillars Undergirding a Civil Gideon
First, this Article considers in more detail an appropriate
methodology for interpreting the Constitution, especially relevant
constitutional provisions supporting a civil right to counsel in
adversarial situations. The Article then critiques Turner v. Rogers’41
exceptionally restrictive articulation of the scope of the right to counsel
in civil cases involving possible incarceration for nonpayment of child
support.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 344.
Id.
Id.
564 U.S. 431 (2011).
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1. A Precis Regarding Holistic Constitutional Interpretation
We confront the initial question of what this Article means
when it uses the word “interpret.” A working definition of “interpret”
for purposes of this Article is drawn from the Oxford English
Dictionary: “[t]o expound the meaning of (something abstruse or
mysterious); to render (words, writings, an author, etc.) clear or
explicit; to elucidate; to explain.”42 In plain language, in this Article,

42. Interpret,
OXFORD
ENGLISH
DICTIONARY,
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/
98205?rskey=L9XL2b&result=2&isAdvanced=false#eid (last visited Nov. 26, 2019) (available by
subscription). Other theories of knowledge cover a broad spectrum including classical Greek
thought as reflected in Plato’s Theaetetus:
Socrates: Now consider whether knowledge is a thing you can possess in that way
without having it about you, like a man who has caught some wild birds—pigeons or what
not—and keeps them in an aviary he has made for them at home. In a sense, of course, we
might say he ‘has’ them all the time inasmuch as he possesses them, mightn’t we?
Theaetetus: Yes.
Socrates: But in another sense he ‘has’ none of them, though he has got control of them,
now that he has made them captive in an enclosure of his own; he can take and have hold
of them whenever he likes by catching any bird he chooses, and let them go again, and it is
open to him to do that as often as he pleases.
Theaetetus: That is so.
Socrates: Once more then, just as a while ago we imagined a sort of a waxen block in our
minds, so now let us suppose that every mind contains a kind of aviary stocked with birds
of every sort, some in flocks apart from the rest, some in small groups, and some solitary,
flying in any direction among them all.
Theaetetus: Be it so. What follows?
Socrates: When we are babies we must suppose this receptacle empty, and take the birds
to stand for pieces of knowledge. Whenever a person acquires any piece of knowledge and
shuts it up in his enclosure, we must say he has learned or discovered the thing of which
this is the knowledge, and that is what ‘knowing’ means.
THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 904 (Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., 1971). A
nineteenth century English literature insight regarding the power to define the meaning of words
gushes from Lewis Carroll’s portrayal of Humpty Dumpty:
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, “it means just what I
choose it to mean—neither more nor less.”
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different
things.”
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—that’s all.”
LEWIS CARROLL, THE ANNOTATED ALICE: ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND & THROUGH THE LOOKINGGLASS 251 (Martin Gardner ed., 2015) (1960). More recent erudite discussions on legal theory can
be found in works by thoughtful scholars like Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of
History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641 (2013) and Professors Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, No
Arbitrary Power: An Originalist Theory of the Due Process of Law, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1599
(2019).
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“interpret” means an attempt to explain as clearly and logically as
possible what the words of a text mean. The particular text upon which
the Article focuses is the Constitution of the United States of America.
In this context, it is beyond the scope of this Article to parse and
explore the innumerable permutations, nuances, and possible
alternative explanations of “interpret.” That could be the focus of many
volumes. To reduce the ambiguity inherent in this language, this Article
simply attempts to communicate sufficiently clearly what interpret
means here.
With that said, the Article now considers how to best interpret the
Constitution. To facilitate analysis, a brief review of some
interpretation methods follows.43 We begin with McCulloch v.
Maryland,44 a two-hundred-year-old constitutional law decision (a real
“chestnut”) that exemplifies several well-accepted devices often found
in the methodological toolbox of an interpreter of the Constitution. The
following overview is not meant to be an exhaustive discussion of
constitutional interpretation. The Article simply offers a thumbnail
sketch, which may help to illuminate the upcoming analysis of relevant
constitutional provisions as well as the Turner case.
2. Interpretation Lessons from McCulloch
In McCulloch, the United States government chartered a national
bank to facilitate financial transactions on a federal level and to
circumvent some parochial challenges associated with state banks.45
After the creation of the national bank, the Commonwealth of Maryland
subsequently passed legislation that imposed a $15,000 tax on nonMaryland banks doing business in Maryland. J.W. McCulloch, a federal
bank employee, did not pay the Maryland state tax.46 The
Commonwealth of Maryland obtained a judgment to recover the state

43. See generally PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION MAKING 55–62 (7th
ed. 2018); CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS NAMED AND UNNAMED
(1997); PHILLIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (Oxford University
Press 1982); Barnett & Bernick, supra note 42; Ronald Dworkin, Natural Law Revisited, 34 U. FLA.
L. REV. 165 (1982).
44. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
45. Id. at 317, 332–33.
46. Id. at 317–19.
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tax.47 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Court
unanimously overturned the state court decision.48
The McCulloch Court considered several approaches to
constitutional analysis.
a. Precedent
The Court began by evaluating existing precedent. The Court
emphasized that Congress had previously enacted legislation creating a
national bank.49 However, the Court said that Congress later allowed
the legislation to lapse.50 Once the legislation expired and the Bank
ceased to exist, the nation suffered negative experiences because of the
absence of a financial institution capable of funding vital national
projects. Accordingly, Congress reestablished a national bank.51
Regarding historical precedent, the Court stated: “The principle now
contested was introduced at a very early period of our history, has
been recognized by many successive legislatures, and has been acted
upon by the judicial department, in cases of peculiar delicacy, as a law
of undoubted obligation.”52
b. Text and Structure
Not only did McCulloch appeal to precedent, but that case also
discussed the interplay of constitutional text and structure
(governmental architecture). For instance, the Court addressed the
structural issue of whether the Constitution was a creation of the States
or of the people. The Court’s rationale included reliance upon the
words of the Preamble: “We the People of the United States . . . do
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America.”53 The Court stated that in creating the Constitution, the
people of the United States met in conventions and established a legal
structure in which the federal constitution, laws, and treaties were

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id. at 437.
Id. at 354.
Id. at 353.
Id. at 325.
Id. at 401.
U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added). See also McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 403–04.
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supreme.54 Thus, McCulloch affirmed that constitutional power resides
in the people.
According to McCulloch, the national government possessed the
authority to create a national bank based upon the words of the
Constitution and the structural relationship—that is, the governmental
architecture—that the Constitution created between the central
government and the states. McCulloch pointed out:
Although, among the enumerated powers of government, we do not
find the word “bank” or “incorporation,” we find the great powers,
to lay and collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to
declare and conduct a war; and to raise and support armies and
navies. The sword and the purse, all the external relations, and no
inconsiderable portion of the industry of the nation, are entrusted
to its government. . . . [I]t may with great reason be contended, that
a government, entrusted with such ample powers, on the due
execution of which the happiness and prosperity of the nation so
vitally depends, must also be entrusted with ample means for their
execution. The power being given, it is the interest of the nation to
facilitate its execution. It can never be their interest, and cannot be
presumed to have been their intention, to clog and embarrass its
execution by withholding the most appropriate means.55

Thus, the Court concluded that the national government could
establish a national bank because the Framers created a constitution
that would authorize the national government to achieve ambitious
national goals like regulating commerce and conducting wars.56
Accordingly, the lack of specific constitutional language allowing the
incorporation of a national bank was not fatal to the claim that
Congress had power to create such a financial institution.
Again, appealing to the governmental architecture of the
Constitution, McCulloch said:
A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of
which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which
they may be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of
a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It
would, probably, never be understood by the public. Its nature,
54. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
55. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 407–08.
56. Id. at 408.
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therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its
important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which
compose those objects, be deduced from the nature of the objects
themselves. That this idea was entertained by the framers of the
American constitution, is not only to be inferred from the nature of
the instrument, but from the language. . . . [W]e must never forget
that it is a constitution we are expounding.57

c. Legislative History (and Precedent Again)
McCulloch countered the argument that Congress exceeded its
authority because the Constitution did not expressly provide for the
creation of a national bank. The Court responded to opponents’ textual
objections by returning to an analysis of precedent as well as other
provisions in the text of the Constitution. Specifically, the Court
reviewed part of the Constitution’s drafting history and contrasted the
Constitution with its predecessor, the Articles of Confederation. Unlike
the Articles, the Constitution did not say that national governmental
powers were limited to expressly enumerated powers in the
Constitution. The Court said that “there is no phrase in the instrument
which, like the articles of confederation, excludes incidental or implied
powers; and which requires that everything granted shall be expressly
and minutely described.”58
The Court focused attention upon the Tenth Amendment, which
left out the word expressly. The Court explained the significance of
omitting expressly as follows:
Even the 10th [A]mendment, which was framed for the
purpose of quieting the excessive jealousies which had been
excited, omits the word ‘expressly,’ and declares only, that the
powers ‘not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited to
the States, are reserved to the States or to the people;’ thus
leaving the question, whether the particular power which
may become the subject of contest has been delegated to the
one government, or prohibited to the other, to depend on a
fair construction of the whole instrument.59

57. Id. at 407.
58. Id. at 406.
59. Id.
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The Framers could have written the Amendment as follows: “The
powers not expressly delegated to the United States by the Constitution
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively or to the people.” The Framers chose to omit “expressly”
leaving us with the text as it exists now. The Tenth Amendment simply
says: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.”60
d. A Holistic Interpretative Approach
The Court’s analysis drew not only upon precedent, textual
analysis, and structure, but also upon prudential concerns regarding
how to read the text. According to McCulloch, constitutional
interpretation must depend upon a “fair construction of the whole
instrument,”61 not upon cherry picking disconnected parts.
In addition, the Court emphasized that the Constitution’s
provisions are subject to differing interpretations, which may vary over
time. “[T]he question respecting the extent of the powers actually
granted, is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, so
long as our system shall exist.”62
When Chief Justice Marshall said, “we must never forget, that it
is a constitution we are expounding,”63 Marshall recognized that
constitutional texts must be read as judges read the common law—
carefully examining the facts, precedent, text, structure, prudential
concerns, and other relevant factors. Repeating for emphasis, the
purpose of such analysis is to deduce “a fair construction of the whole
instrument.”64
In a similar vein, in his classic text on expounding human rights
under the United States Constitution, Professor Charles L. Black, Jr.
said: “The methods of law are not a closed canon. The problems they
must solve are infinite and unforeseeable. The solutions will never
have the quality of the Pythagorean Theorem; time may even bring the

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

U.S. CONST. amend. X.
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 406.
Id. at 405.
Id. at 407 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 406.
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conviction that some solutions, though confidently arrived at, were
wrong, and must be revised.”65
Professor Ronald Dworkin championed a similar approach. He
suggested that judges should adopt a natural law informed
methodology (“naturalism”) in deciding cases, and that such an
adjudicatory process could be analogized to writing a chain novel.
Dworkin writes:
[C]ommon law adjudication is a chain enterprise. . . . According to
naturalism, a judge should decide fresh cases in the spirit of a
novelist in the chain writing a fresh chapter. The judge must make
creative decisions, but must try to make these decisions “going on
as before” rather than by starting in a new direction as if writing on
a clean slate. He must read through (or have some good idea
through his legal training and experience) what other judges in the
past have written, not simply to discover what these other judges
have said, or their state of mind when they said it, but to reach an
opinion about what they have collectively done. . . . Of course, the
best interpretation of past judicial decisions is the interpretation
that shows these in the best light, not aesthetically but politically, as
coming as close to the correct ideals of a just legal system as
possible. Judges in the chain of law share with the chain novelists
the imperative of interpretation, but they bring different standards
of success—political rather than aesthetic—to bear on that
enterprise.66

Dworkin’s approach resembles Marshall’s in McCulloch in that
Marshall emphasized:
[The Constitution’s] nature, therefore, requires, that only its great
outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and
the minor ingredients which compose those objects, be deduced
from the nature of the objects themselves. That this idea was
entertained by the framers of the American constitution, is not only
to be inferred from the nature of the instrument, but from the
language.67

For Dworkin, judges should “interpret[] the political structure of
their community . . . by trying to find the best justification they can find,
65. BLACK, JR., supra note 43, at 14–15.
66. Dworkin, supra note 43, at 168.
67. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 407.
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in principles of political morality . . . from the most profound
constitutional rules and arrangements to the details of, for example, the
private law of tort or contract.”68 For purposes of this analysis, in
interpreting the Constitution, “the important objects,” to use Marshall’s
words,69 also can reflect what Dworkin calls “the political structure of
[a] community.”70 Dworkin and Marshall both seek the best outcome
given the structure of the legal system within which they are operating.
Dworkin’s focus on “the best justification . . . in principles of
political morality, for the structure as a whole”71 means that
interpretation of the Constitution must consider values like universal
liberty and justice proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence.
Specifically, it states: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
pursuit of Happiness.”72 Likewise, the Constitution should be read to
reinforce the Declaration’s affirmation that the government is
responsible for securing universal liberty and equality: “[T]o secure
these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just
powers from the consent of the governed.”73
In this vein, on January 1, 1861, a little over eighty years after the
Declaration boldly trumpeted American values, Abraham Lincoln wrote
a New Year’s Day note to himself as he prepared to assume the
presidency of a fracturing Union. In the following words, Lincoln
summarized the relationship between the Declaration’s proclamation
of freedom and the Constitution’s protection of liberty:
There is something back of these, entwining itself more closely
about the human heart. That something, is the principle of “Liberty
to all”—the principle that clears the path for all—gives hope to
all—and, by consequence, enterprize, and industry to all.

.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

.

Dworkin, supra note 43, at 165.
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 407.
Dworkin, supra note 43, at 165.
Id.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (1776).
Id.

.
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The assertion of that principle, at that time, was the word, “fitly
spoken” which has proved an “apple of gold” to us. The Union, and
the Constitution, are the picture of silver, subsequently framed
around it. The picture was made, not to conceal, or destroy the
apple; but to adorn, and preserve it. The picture was made for the
apple—not the apple for the picture.
So let us act, that neither picture, or apple shall ever be blurred, or
bruised or broken.74

Again, the apple of gold—in Lincoln’s words “liberty to all” or
universal freedom—lies at the heart of American constitutional law. It
is central to why we have a constitution—a powerful picture protecting
the apple. The primary goal of the Constitution is to establish a nation
of liberty and justice for all.75
Such an approach has global implications. For example, in a
similar international key, the Constitution of the Republic of South
Africa expressly incorporates a human-rights-friendly approach into its
interpretive framework. Section 1(a) of Article 39 of the South African
Constitution states: “When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court,
tribunal or forum must promote the values that underlie an open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.”76
Thus, in South Africa, political morality, democracy, human dignity,
equality, and freedom must all be central to constitutional
interpretation.
Last for our purposes, but certainly not least, the Constitution
provides for separation of powers among three co-equal branches.
Thus, interpreters also need to consider how other branches of the
government have comprehended the particular constitutional
provision(s).77 To facilitate unity of purpose in promoting the public
interest, governmental decision makers in each branch should give due

74. Abraham Lincoln, Fragment on The Constitution and Union, TEACHING AMERICAN HISTORY
(Jan.
1,
1861),
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/fragment-on-theconstitution-and-union/.
75. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote
the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain
and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.”).
76. CONST. OF THE REPUBLIC OF S. AFR. art. 39(1)(a).
77. BREST, supra note 43, at 55–62(citations omitted).
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deference to how other branches articulate the Constitution whether
through legislation, judicial decision, or executive administration.
The modalities78 of constitutional analysis, which the Article has
just outlined, are not exhaustive. They represent some, though not all,
of the interpretive tools used to give meaning to the Constitution.79
With that caveat, the Article now considers relevant constitutional
provisions regarding a right to court-appointed counsel in civil
adversarial cases. We begin with the Sixth Amendment, and then
evaluate in turn the Fifth, Fourteenth, and Ninth Amendments.
Following that analysis, the Article critiques the Turner decision.
3. Relevant American Human Rights Provisions and Their Interpretation
a. The Sixth Amendment
We begin with a textual analysis of the Sixth Amendment: “In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”80 The Sixth Amendment does
not say that the right to the assistance of counsel is limited only to
criminal prosecutions. Nor does the Amendment expressly limit itself
exclusively or solely to criminal prosecutions. The Framers could have
said: “In only Criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to
have the assistance of counsel for his defense.” Or “solely in Criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense.” Likewise, they could have stated, “exclusively
in Criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense.” While the Framers were free to
expressly limit the Sixth Amendment right to counsel only, solely, or
exclusively to federal criminal prosecutions, the text does not
unequivocally do so.
On the other hand, it is certainly true that one possible
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment is that the Amendment applies
only, solely, and exclusively to criminal prosecutions. In the recent case
of Turner v. Rogers,81 involving an indigent civil defendant in a civil

78. Id. at 55.
79. Dworkin, supra note 43, at 166. See generally JOHN BELL & GEORGE ENGLE, CROSS: STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION (2d ed. 1987); BLACK, JR., supra note 43, at 14–15.
80. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
81. 564 U.S. 431 (2011).
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contempt child custody proceeding, the Court said that “the Sixth
Amendment does not govern civil cases.”82 We will come back to a
more complete analysis of that overly restrictive judicial gloss of the
Sixth Amendment momentarily.
In the meantime, this Article argues that a better approach to
understanding the Sixth Amendment would be to read the Sixth
Amendment as part of a whole fabric of human rights’ protection
woven into the Constitution itself. With that, we turn to an evaluation
of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
b. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses
The Constitution’s broad protection of human rights includes the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which says that “No person
shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.”83 The Amendment contemplates that each person has a right to
Due Process—that is a fair process—in all circumstances where the
person is in jeopardy of losing her life or freedom or property. Again,
the text is key. The words of the Fifth Amendment literally embrace
both criminal and civil federal cases.
The same is true of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, which applies to the States. The Amendment says that “[n]o
State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.”84 The Fourteenth Amendment is silent regarding
whether its Due Process Clause applies only to civil cases, criminal
cases, or both.
Ratified three years following the close of the American Civil War,
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause was designed to
alleviate the oppression of African Americans subjected to Black Codes
and other nefarious legal devices fashioned by ex-confederates and
their sympathizers who sought to create conditions as close to slavery
as possible.85 For instance, in 1873, in the Slaughter-House Cases,86
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 441.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1873); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:
AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION: 1863–1877, at 119–23 (1988); 1 SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE
OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE: 1789–1877 (1972); VA. WRITERS PROGRAM OF THE WORK
PROJECTS ADMIN. OF THE STATE OF VA., THE NEGRO IN VIRGINIA 226 (1940). Much of this analysis of the
Reconstruction cases is excerpted from JONATHAN K. STUBBS, Epilogue, in THE MEMOIRS OF HON.
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decided eight years after the end of the War, the Court analyzed the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution.
The Court stated:
[N]o one can fail to be impressed with the one pervading purpose
found in them all, lying at the foundation of each, and without which
none of them would have been even suggested; we mean the
freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of
that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and
citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised
unlimited dominion over him.87

By saying that the Constitution safeguarded the rights of African
Americans, the Court took a giant step forward compared to the Dred
Scott88 decision, which had said that blacks had no rights that whites
were bound to respect.
Nevertheless, even though the Fourteenth Amendment conferred
national citizenship to formerly enslaved persons, the Slaughter-House
Court contended that the national rights of citizens were extremely
limited. For example, national citizenship rights encompassed the right
to petition the government to change its policies, to have the assistance
of the national government if the citizen were in trouble on the high
seas or with a foreign government, and to move freely from one state to
another. In contrast to puny national citizenship rights, the SlaughterHouse Court said that the states controlled most meaningful rights of
citizenship.89 In this respect, the Slaughter-House Court’s analysis was
problematic because throughout the post-Civil War South, state
governments were increasingly dominated by ex-confederates hostile
to African Americans exercising their freedom on equal terms with
whites.
In Strauder v. West Virginia,90 decided seven years after SlaughterHouse, the Court charted a more human-rights-friendly interpretive
path. The Court struck down a West Virginia statute that limited jurors

HENRY L. MARSH, III: CIVIL RIGHTS CHAMPION, PUBLIC SERVANT, LAWYER 190–98 (Jonathan K. Stubbs &
Danielle Wingfield-Smith eds., 2018).
86. 83 U.S. at 43–44, 71.
87. Id. at 71.
88. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856).
89. 83 U.S. at 79–80.
90. 100 U.S. 303, 305–06 (1880).
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to white men who were at least twenty-one years of age.91 Regarding
the appropriate approach to constitutional interpretation, the Strauder
Court stated that the Fourteenth Amendment
is to be construed liberally, to carry out the purposes of its framers. It
ordains that no State shall make or enforce any laws which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States. . . . It ordains that no State shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law, or deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. What
is this but declaring that the law in the States shall be the same for
the black as for the white; that all persons, whether colored or
white, shall stand equal before the laws of the States, and, in regard
to the colored race, for whose protection the amendment was
primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made against
them by law because of their color? The words of the amendment
[while prohibitory] contain a necessary implication of a positive
immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored race,—the right to
exemption from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as
colored,—exemption from legal discriminations, implying
inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment
of the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are
steps towards reducing them to the condition of a subject race.92

Despite the text of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Strauder
Court’s constructive modes of clarifying its meaning, in later cases the
Court read the Fourteenth Amendment too narrowly. For example,
three years after Strauder, in the Civil Rights Cases,93 the Court
retreated from the Constitution’s promise of liberty and justice for all.
More specifically, in the Civil Rights Act of 1875, Congress outlawed
race discrimination against blacks in public theaters, inns, as well as on
railroads. In the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court ruled that much
of the Civil Rights Act was unconstitutional.94
91. Id. at 305.
92. Id. at 307–08 (emphasis added).
93. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
94. Id. at 24–25. The opinion of the majority reflected the mentality of many members of the
white general public. Such persons equated changes in the law with a practical transformation of
the human condition which African Americans lived. The Court stated:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation has shaken
off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in the progress of
his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to be the special
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The Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to apply only to
“state action,” and then so narrowly defined state action that it would
have been easier for the proverbial “camel to go through the eye of a
needle”95 than for a person of color to prove unconstitutional race
discrimination—especially in public spaces. The Court subverted the
Amendment to allow race discrimination to flourish in most areas of
American civic life.96 The Court’s interpretation of the Amendment
shackled Congress’ ability to limit race discrimination in public
settings.97 In short, ensuring that African Americans received the same
treatment as white folks—the real meaning of equal protection of the
laws—was, for the Court in The Civil Rights Cases, simply going too far.
Justice Harlan spoke eloquently against the decision of the
majority to gut the rights of the newly freed blacks:
[T]he national legislature may, without transcending the limits of
the Constitution, do for human liberty and the fundamental rights of
American citizenship, what it did, with the sanction of this court, for
the protection of slavery and the rights of the masters of fugitive
slaves. If fugitive slave laws . . . whereby the master could seize and
recover his fugitive slave, were legitimate exercises of an implied
power to protect and enforce a right recognized by the Constitution,
why shall the hands of Congress be tied, so that—under an express
power . . . to enforce a constitutional provision granting
citizenship—it may not, by . . . direct legislation, bring the whole
power of this nation to bear upon States and their officers, and upon
such individuals and corporations exercising public functions as
assume to abridge, impair, or deny rights confessedly secured by
the supreme law of the land?98

favorite of the laws, and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the
ordinary modes by which other men’s rights are protected.
Id. at 25.
95. Matthew 19:24 (New International Version).
96. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 46.
97. Id. at 60.
98. Id. at 53. In fact, instead of reaching out a helping hand to the downtrodden, the Court
molded the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to benefit the rich and powerful. For example,
three years later, in 1886 in Cty. Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., the Court concluded unanimously
that under the Fourteenth Amendment railroads were persons. Less than twenty years after the
Fourteenth Amendment was ratified to protect the human rights of former slaves, the Southern
Pacific Railway Court extended human rights guarantees to railroads. According to the Court, the
Fourteenth Amendment entitled railroads to equal protection of the laws. See Cty. Santa Clara v. S.
Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).

480

Stetson Law Review

[Vol. 49

Approximately a dozen years after The Civil Rights Cases, a human
rights test case that went terribly wrong was initiated by Homer Plessy,
a fair-skinned African American.99 According to court records, Plessy
looked like a white person. Plessy wanted to have the local Louisiana
segregation statutes overturned because they violated the Fourteenth
Amendment’s provision that every person in the United States is
entitled to equal protection of the laws. Plessy was arrested for riding
in the whites-only section in a Louisiana railway car.100
Plessy filed suit challenging the local segregation statutes. In an
eight-to-one decision, the United States Supreme Court ruled against
him. The Court held that the state’s statutes were not unreasonable.101
The Court said that if the segregation statutes discriminated in a
demeaning manner, the problem was primarily in the minds of blacks
who chose to look at the statutes in that way. The majority stated:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to
consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two
races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be
so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely
because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon
it.102

Based on this tortured logic, the Court ruled that the segregation
statutes did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause.
In his dissent, Justice Harlan argued that the real impact of the
segregation statutes was that blacks were perceived as being so
debased and inferior that they were not free to associate with white
citizens:
Sixty millions of whites are in no danger from the presence here of
eight millions of blacks. The destinies of the two races, in this
country, are indissolubly linked together, and the interests of both
require that the common government of all shall not permit the

99. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 538 (1896).
100. Id. at 538–39. At least one account of Plessy’s arrest states that Plessy identified himself
by saying to the streetcar conductor: “I have to tell you that, according to Louisiana law, I am a
colored man.” See HARVEY FIRESIDE, SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: HOMER PLESSY AND THE SUPREME COURT
DECISION THAT LEGALIZED RACISM 1 (2004).
101. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550–51.
102. Id. at 551.
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seeds of race hate to be planted under the sanction of law. What can
more certainly arouse race hate, what more certainly create and
perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these races, than state
enactments, which, in fact, proceed on the ground that colored
citizens are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to
sit in public coaches occupied by white citizens? That, as all will
admit, is the real meaning of such legislation as was enacted in
Louisiana.103

Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment conferred upon Congress
plenary authority to alleviate color- and caste-based discrimination:
“Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.”104 As the Court recognized two hundred
years ago in McCulloch v. Maryland,105 the Constitution is a document
“intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted
to the various crises of human affairs.”106
Accordingly, in cases like Plessy, the Court could have upheld
Congress’ plenary power and expounded the Constitution on a case-bycase common law basis to blaze a freedom trail for vulnerable
members of American society. Through a liberal interpretation and
application of the substantive provisions of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment—specifically the Privileges or Immunities and Equal
Protection Clauses as well as Section 5—liberty and justice for all could
have been more fully realized. Instead, the Court effectively barricaded
the logical jurisprudential path for expounding American human rights
law. The Court’s hostile interpretative analysis led to unfortunate
consequences for race discrimination victims as well as the broad
landscape of American human rights jurisprudence.
When the Court abdicated its responsibility to protect the
constitutional rights of societal outcasts, the Court confronted an
important theoretical and practical problem: how to protect the human
rights outlined in the Bill of Rights from oppressive state laws and
policies. The Court’s response to its previous missteps was the creation
of what Professor Charles Black called the “incorrigibly self-

103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 560.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
Id. at 415.
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contradictory” doctrine of substantive due process.107 In practice, the
courts have used this doctrine to buttress the conclusion that most of
the provisions of the Bill of Rights apply to the states via the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.108 Professor Black
summed matters up in these words: “The ‘due process’ clause is being
made to carry the load that would far more naturally have been
assigned to the ‘privileges and immunities’ clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, jointly with the two ‘citizenship’ clauses in that
Amendment.”109 Professor Black’s analysis neatly synthesizes the
results of the Court having painted itself into a proverbial
jurisprudential corner.110
So far, the Article has contended that to protect liberty and justice
for all, read the text of the Constitution as Strauder mandated—
“liberally.”111 Such an approach should be adopted by members of each
branch of government—executive, legislative, and judicial—as well as
the general public.
And what, if anything else, furnishes the constitutional mandate
for such an interpretation approach? So glad you asked: that is the
essence of what the Framers required in the Ninth Amendment to
which we now turn.
c. The Ninth Amendment
The Ninth Amendment states: “The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people.”112 The text of the Ninth
Amendment contemplates that in the United States, individuals have
rights which are not enumerated in the Constitution. The Constitution
mandates that unenumerated rights are to be recognized and protected
to the same extent as the enumerated rights outlined elsewhere—for
instance, in the preceding eight Amendments.113
107. BLACK, JR., supra note 43, at 91; see generally id. at 87–106 (discussing the validation of
substantive rights through the “substantive due process” clause).
108. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341 (1963); BLACK, JR., supra note 43, at 91.
109. BLACK, JR., supra note 43, at 93. Gideon did not apply the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
to the States through the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment either, but rather
through the Due Process Clause.
110. Id.
111. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 (1880).
112. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
113. Id.
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As argued previously, Chief Justice Marshall as well as Professors
Black and Dworkin illuminate proper interpretation of constitutional
texts, particularly where the Framers have structured the Constitution
to accomplish broad goals like providing a mechanism to finance
national projects (McCulloch)114 or protecting the rights of persons
previously enslaved and tormented in barbaric circumstances
(Strauder).115 Repeating for emphasis, as Chief Justice Marshall said in
McCulloch:
[A] government, [e]ntrusted with such ample powers, on the due
execution of which the happiness and prosperity of the nation so
vitally depends, must also be [e]ntrusted with ample means for
their execution. The power being given, it is the interest of the
nation to facilitate its execution. It can never be their interest, and
cannot be presumed to have been their intention, to clog and
embarrass its execution by withholding the most appropriate
means.116

McCulloch dealt with the scope of national governmental power. A
similar interpretive approach is necessary to facilitate another
important governmental objective: protecting individual liberty. A
miserly interpretation of the human rights provisions of the
Constitution simply will not do. As Professor Black presciently said:
There is a myth that lawyers must think small, even meanly, or lose
the aura of professionalism. As in all other matters, we should think
at the level of magnitude proportioned to the problem. Insistence
on thinking small veils the largest facts from view. If we are to have
a true system, a productive system of human rights, we have to
commit ourselves to thinking large. If we are to take seriously the
noble words of our past, we must pronounce them with emphasis
and without apologetic hesitation. After all, in doing this we risk a
good deal less than being hanged, drawn, and quartered.117

114.
115.
116.
117.

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
Strauder, 100 U.S. at 307.
McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 408.
BLACK, JR., supra note 43, at 36; see also BENNETT B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH
AMENDMENT: A CALL FOR LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS UNDER SOCIAL CONDITIONS
TODAY 53 (1955) (“[T]he Ninth Amendment is a living and growing philosophy. It was intended
and has been interpreted as part of a living and growing Constitution. The Magna Carta has not
been restricted by English law to the rights of Englishmen as they existed in 1215 on the field at
Runnymede. In the same manner the natural rights of Americans should not be static and fixed as
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Accordingly, the Constitution should be interpreted to facilitate
(and not frustrate) universal freedom and justice. An appropriate
methodology would include, but not be limited to, the following steps:
1. Analyze the facts of each case carefully;
2. Review precedent;118
3. Carefully evaluate the words of the text as well as how a
particular decision would impact the existing constitutional
structure;119
4. Identify the values (“principles of political morality”)120
espoused in the Constitution and Declaration of Independence;
5. Expound the meaning of the text in the way in which common
law judges decide cases; and
6. Ultimately, in resolving legal disputes, make the type of decision
that treats all others as you would like to be treated if you were in
their situation.

Having argued for a human-rights-friendly method of
constitutional construction, this Article now shifts attention to an
evaluation of the Court’s decision in Turner v. Rogers.121
of the date of the adoption of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights”); cf., KURT T. LASH, THE LOST
HISTORY OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 82 (2009) (“The text of the Ninth Amendment prevents
interpretations of enumerated rights that negatively affect the unenumerated retained rights of
the people. Neither unduly narrow nor excessively broad interpretations of enumerated rights
violate the Ninth Amendment as long as the fact of enumeration is not relied upon to suggest the
necessity or superiority of enumeration. It is possible to use the Ninth as implied or indirect
support for general theories of broad—or narrow—constructions of enumerated rights, but these
secondary theories depend on the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment. Because the
historical record suggests a state-protective understanding of the amendment, the Ninth ought not
to be used in support of broadly interpreted restrictions on the retained rights of the people in the
states.”). Contra DANIEL FARBER, RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE 44 (2007) (“The proposal that became the
Ninth Amendment was not paired with the future Tenth Amendment. It was not about federalism;
it was about individual rights. Those individual rights belonged to the same genre as free speech
(in the proposed Bill of Rights) or the ban on ex post facto law (in the original Constitution).
Explicitly listing rights had advantages, in terms of both reassuring the public and stimulating
judges to come more readily to their defense. But Madison had done as much as he could to
communicate that the listing was not exclusive.”).
118. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 437.
119. BLACK, JR., supra note 43, at 1–40.
120. Dworkin, supra note 43, at 165.
121. 564 U.S. 431 (2011).
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4. The Case of Michael Turner
Michael Turner was a noncustodial parent in South Carolina who
owed child support. A South Carolina state court ordered him to pay
the arrearages. When Turner failed to obey the court order to pay, the
state judge found Turner in civil contempt of the court’s order. The
state court imposed a term of imprisonment upon Turner for one year
or until he discharged his debt.122
While incarcerated, Turner obtained pro bono legal assistance and
argued that in the civil contempt proceeding, he had a right to the
assistance of legal counsel. Turner further contended that the state had
denied him the right to assistance of such counsel. The South Carolina
state courts ruled against Turner.123 He appealed to the Supreme Court
of the United States.
The Turner Court began its analysis by pointing out that “the Sixth
Amendment does not govern civil cases.”124 The Turner Court also
acknowledged that “[t]his Court has decided only a handful of cases
that more directly concern a right to counsel in civil matters. And the
application of those decisions to the present case is not clear.”125 After
reviewing pertinent cases, the Turner Court concluded that its prior
cases “had found a right to counsel ‘only’ in [civil] cases involving
incarceration, not that a right to counsel exists in all such cases.”126
As to the facts in Turner itself, the Court applied the following
analytical framework:
[W]e consequently determine the “specific dictates of due process”
by examining the “distinct factors” that this Court has previously
found useful in deciding what specific safeguards the Constitution’s
Due Process Clause requires in order to make a civil proceeding
fundamentally fair. As relevant here those factors include (1) the
nature of “the private interest that will be affected,” (2) the
comparative “risk” of an “erroneous deprivation” of that interest

122. Id. at 437.
123. Id. at 438.
124. Id. at 441. The constitutional exegesis of the present Court is due great respect. However,
as previously stated, the text of the Sixth Amendment does not say that the right to assistance of
counsel only, exclusively, or solely applies to criminal prosecutions. Moreover, the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments should be interpreted as mutually reinforcing and complementary rather than
exclusive and potentially at odds.
125. Id. at 442.
126. Id. at 443.
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with and without “additional or substitute procedural safeguards,”
and (3) the nature and magnitude of any countervailing interest in
not
providing
“additional
or
substitute
procedural
requirement[s].”127

The Court said that Turner’s interest in remaining free from
incarceration “argues strongly for the right to counsel that Turner
advocates.”128 Indeed, Turner was indigent and faced—and served—
jail time.129 Nevertheless, Turner failed to persuade the Court that
fundamental fairness required appointment of state-funded counsel.
Instead, the Turner Court focused upon the circumstances of Rebecca
Rogers, the mother of Turner’s child. The Court emphasized that
Rogers was unrepresented by legal counsel. Because Rogers (like
Turner) was unrepresented by a lawyer, from the Court’s perspective,
the appointment of counsel for Turner
could create an asymmetry of representation that would “alter
significantly the nature of the proceeding.” Doing so could mean a
degree of formality or delay that would unduly slow payment to
those immediately in need. And, perhaps more important for
present purposes, doing so could make the proceedings less fair
overall, increasing the risk of a decision that would erroneously
deprive a family of the support it is entitled to receive. The needs of
such families play an important role in our analysis.130

The Court also argued that less stringent measures could ensure
fundamental fairness, including an accurate determination of whether
an indigent defendant could pay child support.131 The Court suggested
that such procedures encompassed advance notice to a defendant that
the ability of defendant to pay would be a key issue in the tribunal’s
decision, appropriate forms to elicit information regarding defendant’s
economic status, and an opportunity to be heard as well as to present
evidence.132
In these circumstances, the Turner Court held that

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 444–45 (citations omitted).
Id. at 445.
Id. at 438–39.
Id. at 447 (citations omitted).
Id. at 446.
Id. at 447–48.
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the Due Process Clause does not automatically require the
provision of counsel at civil contempt proceedings to an
indigent individual who is subject to a child support order,
even if that individual faces incarceration (for up to a year). In
particular, that Clause does not require the provision of
counsel where the opposing parent or other custodian (to
whom support funds are owed) is not represented by counsel
and the State provides alternative procedural safeguards
equivalent to those we have mentioned (adequate notice of
the importance of ability to pay, fair opportunity to present,
and to dispute, relevant information, and court findings).133
In essence, in civil contempt child support cases, Turner holds that
the defendant does not automatically have a right to court appointed
counsel where: (1) his failure to pay will subject him to incarceration,
(2) the custodial parent or guardian is not represented by a lawyer, and
(3) adequate process protections exist to ascertain whether the
indigent individual can pay.134
Applying its due process test to the facts of Turner, the Court
nonetheless vacated the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court,
which had denied relief to Turner. The Supreme Court noted that the
South Carolina state courts had failed to conduct a proper inquiry
regarding whether Turner had the capacity to pay his back child
support.135
Writing for a four-person dissent, Justice Thomas agreed with the
majority that the Sixth Amendment’s protection of the right to counsel
does not apply to civil cases.136 However, Justice Thomas argued that if
the majority’s view of the right to counsel is correct, then the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would “render the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel—as it is currently understood—
superfluous.”137 That is the Fourteenth Amendment would apply to all
criminal proceedings, just as the Sixth Amendment does, as well as to
civil cases. Justice Thomas concluded that:

133. Id. at 448.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 449.
136. Id. at 450 (Thomas J., with Scalia, J., dissenting, and Roberts, C.J., with Alito, J. joining in
Parts I-B and II of the dissent).
137. Id. at 452.
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The majority is correct, therefore, that the Court’s precedent does
not require appointed counsel in the absence of a deprivation of
liberty. . . . But a more complete description of this Court’s cases is
that even when liberty is at stake, the Court has required appointed
counsel in a category of cases only where it would have found the
Sixth Amendment required it—in criminal prosecutions.138

While the entire Turner Court (majority and dissent) agreed that
the Sixth Amendment is inapplicable to civil cases,139 the better view is
that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments should be read
synergistically to protect individual rights in state legal proceedings.
This is how you can apply both Amendments in state proceedings. We
begin by reimagining Gideon’s facts:
A New Gideon Fact Pattern
1. Gideon was convicted of breaking and entering a pool room with
intent to commit a misdemeanor. In Florida, that was a felony.
Accordingly, Gideon was subject to criminal prosecution which
jeopardized his liberty.
2. Assuming that when Gideon broke into the pool hall that Gideon
damaged the pool hall owner’s property, a court could compel
Gideon to pay restitution. To make the pool hall owner whole,
restitution payments would result in Gideon being deprived of some
of his property.
3. Assuming further that Gideon killed someone while breaking in,
Gideon might be charged with a capital offense. In that case,
Gideon’s life would be at stake.

In this reimagined scenario, as in the original case, Gideon would
face criminal proceedings. Accordingly, the Sixth Amendment would
apply. Nonetheless, the Fourteenth Amendment should be read as
furnishing additional protection for the right to counsel because in the
amended scenario, Gideon has so much at stake: his life, liberty, and
property. In such circumstances, rather than making the Sixth
Amendment superfluous, the Fourteenth Amendment should be
138. Id. at 455 (citation omitted).
139. Id. at 441 (majority opinion); id. at 451 (Thomas J., with Scalia, J., dissenting, and Roberts,
C.J., with Alito, J. joining in Parts I-B and II of the dissent).
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interpreted as a supplemental human rights insurance policy. That is,
the Constitution leaves nothing to chance in the criminal law context. In
other words, while the Framers of the Sixth Amendment placed the
right to counsel in a prominent place in the Constitution’s architecture,
the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment provided secondary human
rights insurance coverage. The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
establish a comprehensive, sturdy fortress securing individual freedom
including the rights to life, liberty, and property.
But that is not the end of the story. The text of the Fourteenth
Amendment applies not only to state deprivation of human life but also
human liberty and human property. The Fourteenth Amendment says
that “[n]o state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law . . . .”140 Individuals’ property and their
liberty can be adversely affected in criminal and in civil cases. Literally,
the Amendment applies to all circumstances (civil and criminal) in
which a state could deprive a person of life, liberty, or property.
The Turner decision is an example. Michael Turner went to jail,
and he had to pay child support out of his own material assets. So, the
Fourteenth Amendment’s text, read liberally to protect human
freedom,141 applies to civil cases too. Perceived from this constitutional
perch, the Framers devised sturdy constitutional safeguards to
promote and protect national values central to the establishment of the
United States: universal freedom and equality espoused in the
Declaration of Independence.142
In this context, there is a compelling reason why the Due Process
Clause could and should be read to require appointed counsel for
Turner, his wife, and his child. Both parents and their child have basic
human needs at stake: (a) Turner’s liberty and property; (b) the child’s
human material necessaries; and (c) the wife’s need of financial
resources to care for the child. The Turner majority’s cramped reading
of the Constitution reduces the scope of human freedom for indigent
persons like Turner nearly to a pittance—a subsistence level of
governmental protection. The Court holds basically that if the custodial
parent or guardian does not have a lawyer, neither should the indigent
defendant; even if the defendant, like Turner, may wind up in jail.

140. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
141. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307–08 (1880).
142. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (1776).
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How easy is it for a person sitting in jail to interview for
employment, obtain a job, and earn enough money for child support?
Indeed, how can one seriously argue that in child support or custody
hearings, the best interests of the child require that neither parent have
a lawyer? That is the practical effect of Turner. If the custodial parent is
unrepresented, the non-custodial parent is not entitled to a stateappointed lawyer either. And what about the poor child? Does anyone
in this indigent family have a constitutionally protected right to counsel
when liberty and property are implicated? McCulloch teaches courts
(and other readers of the Constitution) to engage in “expounding” the
Constitution so as to achieve rather than frustrate the goals of a great
nation.143 Should not great nations seek universal liberty and justice?
The Article now sketches and affirms substantive proposals
contained in ABA Resolution 112A144 setting forth the parameters of a
right to counsel for indigent persons in specified civil adversarial
proceedings, namely those in which basic human needs are at stake.
III. ABA RESOLUTION 112A: AN OVERVIEW
Justice Rutledge eloquently articulated treasured national values
when he declared: “Equality before the law in a true democracy is a
matter of right. It cannot be a matter of charity or of favor or of grace or
of discretion.”145
However, in August 2006, the ABA House of Delegates (the ABA
House) acknowledged a sordid fact:
Not only has equality before the law remained merely a matter of
charity in the United States, but that charity has proved woefully
inadequate. The lesson from the past 130 years is that justice for the
poor as a matter of charity or discretion has not delivered on the
promises of “justice for all” and “equal justice under law” that form
the foundation of America’s social contract with all its citizens,
whether rich, poor, or something in between.146

143.
144.
145.
146.

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 408 (1819).
ABA Resolution 112A, supra note 6, at 15.
Id. (quoting Justice Wiley Rutledge).
Id. at 16.
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Put another way, the ABA House recognized that in the United States,
equality before the law is an illusion. Accordingly, the ABA House
unanimously adopted Resolution 112A urging:
federal, state, and territorial governments to provide legal counsel
as a matter of right at public expense to low income persons in
those categories of adversarial proceedings where basic human
needs are at stake, such as those involving shelter, sustenance,
safety, health or child custody, as determined by each
jurisdiction.147

The ABA House of Delegates unanimously specified what basic
human needs meant:
[A]t least the following: shelter, sustenance, safety, health and child
custody.
• “Shelter” includes a person or family’s access to or ability to
remain in an apartment or house, and the habitability of that
shelter.
• “Sustenance” includes a person or family’s sources of income
whether derived from employment, government monetary
payments or “in kind” benefits (e.g., food stamps). Typical legal
proceedings involving this basic human need include denials of or
termination of government payments or benefits. . . .
• “Safety” includes protection from physical harm, such as
proceedings to obtain or enforce restraining orders because of
alleged actual or threatened violence whether in the domestic
context or otherwise.
• “Health” includes access to appropriate health care for treatment
of significant health problems whether that health care is financed
by government (e.g., Medicare, Medicaid, VA, etc.) or as an employee
benefit, through private insurance, or otherwise.

147. Id. at 1.
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• “Child custody” embraces proceedings where the custody of a
child is determined or the termination of parental rights is
threatened.148

ABA Resolution 112A recognized that a civil right to counsel was
not necessarily limited to basic human needs: “Powerful common law,
constitutional, and policy arguments support a governmental
obligation to ensure low income people are provided the means,
including lawyers, to have effective access to the civil courts.”149 In fact,
two years before adopting Resolution 112A, the ABA had elucidated the
civil right to counsel in its amicus brief in Tennessee v. Lane.150 The Lane
case involved denial of due process rights to two individual plaintiffs
who had greatly diminished access to courts because the plaintiffs
suffered paralysis resulting in their confinement to wheel chairs. In
Lane, the ABA amicus brief recognized that too often, courts were (and
are) constructed without elevators, ramps, and other features to enable
all persons to participate in proceedings. In those circumstances, the
ABA brief contended that:
[W]hen important interests are at stake in judicial proceedings, the
Due Process Clause requires more than a theoretical right of access
to the courts; it requires meaningful access. . . . To ensure
meaningful access, particularly when an individual faces the
prospect of coercive State deprivation through the judicial process
of life, liberty, or property, due process often requires the State to
give a litigant affirmative assistance so that he may participate in
the proceedings if he effectively would be unable to participate
otherwise.151

Thus, while for practical considerations, Resolution 112A calls for
an incremental approach beginning with the most pressing human
needs, the Resolution also recognizes that access to justice extends
beyond guaranteeing protection of basic human needs. In other words,
148. Id. at 13. See also ABA Family Law Section Standards of Practice for Lawyers Representing
Children in Custody Cases (May 2, 2003), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam
/aba/images/probono_public_service/ts/standards_of_practice_for_lawyers_representing_childre
n.pdf (including suggested criteria to decide when counsel should be appointed for children in
custody cases).
149. ABA Resolution 112A, supra note 6, at 6.
150. Brief for the American Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 2,
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004) (No. 02-1667).
151. ABA Resolution 112A, supra note 6, at 3.
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the Resolution also is based upon a broader articulation of American
values going back to the Declaration of Independence and encapsulated
in five words: liberty and justice for all.152
For the reasons set forth in Part II, at the very least the
Constitution provides protection for the right to counsel for indigent
persons in civil adversarial proceedings.153 Indigent litigants facing
deprivation of liberty or property in civil cases have no less freedom to
defend themselves than do materially affluent participants in such
proceedings.
Moreover, according to the Legal Services Corporation’s (LSC’s)
2017 Justice Gap Report, indigent civil litigants have an immense
unmet need for legal representation. The 2017 Justice Gap Report
outlined the parameters of the “justice gap,” that is the “difference
between the civil legal needs of low-income Americans and the
resources available to meet those needs.”154 The 2017 Report found
that over sixty million Americans live below the federal poverty line.155
Based on survey data, in 2017, 86% of legal problems reported by such
individuals were unmet.156
Further, four out of every five low-income individuals with legal
problems do not even seek professional legal assistance.157 Many
indigent individuals don’t know where to start seeking resources.
Others might not recognize that their situations require legal
assistance. And yet others simply opt to try and handle the dilemmas
themselves using whatever resources are available (for instance,
informal advice from family and friends).158 In short, only 20% of lowincome individuals with legal difficulties seek expert legal assistance.
Of those 20%, nearly 90% report receiving no help or inadequate
help.159
152. Id. at 2.
153. See supra pt. I.
154. Justice Gap Report, supra note 9, at 6.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 28.
158. Id. at 33.
159. Id. at 6. Another way of looking at matters is this: if only 20% of low-income individuals
needing expert legal assistance seek such assistance, then that means the other 80% are very
unlikely to receive such expert legal help. To compound matters, if nearly 90% of those who do
seek help report receiving no or inadequate help, that suggests that only 10% of the 20% seeking
assistance might be receiving adequate aid. Since 10% of 20% is 2%, one wonders whether only
2% of indigent individuals needing legal assistance wind up satisfied with the help that they
received.
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To make matters worse, the Justice Gap Report estimates that
nearly 70% of indigent persons will have at least one significant legal
problem in the course of a year.160 In fact, the majority of low-income
persons will have multiple legal problems. At least 55% of such
individuals will have at least two challenges. Indeed, some subpopulations, like veterans and victims of recent episodes of domestic
violence, report significantly higher incidences of legal difficulties. For
impoverished veterans, 71% of households confront legal
challenges.161 Distressingly, over 97% of households with recent
domestic violence victims wrestle with such difficulties.162
And what are examples of such challenges? They run the gamut
from child support enforcement (as in Turner);163 to denial of
veterans164 or social security benefits;165 to housing eviction;166 and
fending off creditors who are often seeking payment for health-related
bills incurred by uninsured or underinsured individuals.167 Some
persons are homeless and others only half a step from being so.168
One astounding Justice Gap Report statistic follows: during 2017,
an estimated 1.7 million legal problems were brought to Legal Services
Corporation grantees for resolution, but “these estimated 1.7 million
civil legal problems represent less than 6% of the total civil legal
problems faced by low-income Americans.”169 Stated differently, nearly
95% of indigent Americans’ legal problems are not addressed by legal
aid organizations. In practical terms, the Justice Gap Report suggests
that as many as twenty-eight million legal problems confronting
indigent individuals go unmet by organizations offering legal aid.170
How many of the twenty-eight million legal problems are resolved by
lawyers not affiliated with legal service institutions? The answer is not
clear. But the daunting need for services is evident.
The upshot of all of this is that the needs of the materially
disadvantaged members of American society are enormous. Justice
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 7.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 52.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 22.
See id. at 21.
Id. at 40.
Id. 1.7 million is 6% of 28.3 million.
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Rutledge’s stirring affirmation notwithstanding, in the United States,
liberty and justice for all remains, to put it mildly, an elusive goal. One
wonders whether when it comes to meaningful access to justice, the
situation of materially impoverished persons in the United States is like
that of African Americans following the Civil War. African Americans
looked forward to a “new birth of freedom”171 and viewed the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments as places of legal
refuge from legal oppression. African Americans instead discovered,
painfully and frequently, that the promises of refuge were merely
“splendid baubles, thrown out to delude those who deserved fair and
generous treatment at the hands of the nation.”172 Often that is the way
it is with indigent individuals in civil legal proceedings.
To give a practical example, suppose that a landlord refuses to
comply with his obligations under the Department of Housing and
Urban Development’s Section 8 Program. If the landlord subsequently
seeks to evict a senior citizen on a fixed income who has no legal
representation, the senior citizen and her grandchildren are likely to
suffer homelessness.173 Lack of legal counsel can be a matter of living in
a safe environment, on the street, or not at all.
Something is wrong with this picture. Resolution 112A was simply
a practical, incremental step toward the wider imperative of
meaningful access to civil legal proceedings.174 In some respects, the
ABA Resolution represented the ABA House of Delegates’ attempt to
construct a firm foundation for protecting the human rights of
materially indigent persons in civil cases. But in the context of the
human right to counsel for indigent persons in civil cases, to
paraphrase Robert Frost, America yet has “promises to keep, and miles
to go before [we can] sleep.”175
Part IV of this Article briefly appeals to readers to consider a
paradigm shift to address the pressing needs of individuals who are
materially indigent.

171. Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863) (transcript at
http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/gettysburg.htm).
172. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 48 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
173. See Justice Gap Report, supra note 9, at 25.
174. See ABA Resolution 112A, supra note 6, at 6.
175. Robert Frost, Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening, POETRY FOUND.,
https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/42891/stopping-by-woods-on-a-snowy-evening (last
visited Feb. 3, 2020).
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IV. THE CHOICE: A MORAL REVOLUTION OR AN IMMORAL
CATASTROPHE
[I]f we are to have peace on earth, our loyalties must . . . transcend
our race, our tribe, our class, and our nation; and this means we
must develop a world perspective. No individual can live alone; no
nation can live alone. . . . [W]e must either learn to live together as
brothers [and sisters] or we are all going to perish together as
fools.176

Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. recognized that we are all in this life on
earth together. King accurately perceived that the alternative to living
together as a peaceful human family would be that “we are all going to
perish together as fools.”177 King died fighting for the rights of all
humans—especially persons like Clarence Earl Gideon who found
themselves at the bottom of the social hierarchy. At King’s death, he
was marching with sanitation workers in Memphis and on his way to
lead a Poor People’s Campaign in Washington, D.C.178 King knew that
America could never achieve its greatest potential unless all people
were able to exercise their human rights to the maximum extent
possible. Maximizing human potential is easier when people know, as
well as are able, to defend and exercise their human rights.
And that is where lawyers come in. As the LSC has documented,
tens of millions of Americans do not have access to affordable legal
services. Accordingly, those individuals are stymied in enjoying
constitutionally protected freedoms.179 On a daily basis, without the
guidance and protection that a lawyer can furnish, such individuals are
deprived of what ABA House Resolution 112A refers to as “basic
human needs.”180 The ABA Resolution said:
[W]hen parties lack counsel in civil proceedings . . . to insure that
justice is done in cases involving pro se litigants, courts must
struggle with issues of preserving judicial neutrality (where one
176. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., A Christmas Sermon on Peace, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE
ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., 253, 253 (James M. Washington ed., 1990)
(emphasis added).
177. Id.
178. Olivia B. Waxman, What Happened to Martin Luther King Jr.’s Last Campaigns, Apr. 2, 2018,
TIME, (sub. req.), https://time.com/5221565/martin-luther-king-last-campaign/.
179. Justice Gap Report, supra note 9, at 16 (finding that “[m]ore than 60 million Americas have
family incomes below 125% of the Federal Poverty Level”).
180. ABA Resolution 112A, supra note 6, at 7.
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side is represented and the other is not), balancing competing
demands for court time, and achieving an outcome that is
understood by pro se participants and does not lead to further
proceedings before finality is reached. Meantime large numbers of
pro se litigants lose their families, their housing, their livelihood,
and like fundamental interests, losses many of them would not have
sustained if represented by counsel.181

What situation does Resolution 112A describe? Could it be the
quintessential exemplar of a deprivation of liberty and property
without due process of law?
More to the point, why does this ongoing national nightmare for
millions of Americans continue unabated? Perhaps it is in part because
we as humans are often blinded by our own narrow-minded thinking.
Dr. King gave a telling practical example based on his experience
conversing with the white jailers who wanted to talk with him about
race while they had King locked up in a Birmingham jail. King stated:
[W]e got down one day to the point—that was the second or third
day—to talk about where they lived, and how much they were
earning. And when those brothers told me what they were earning, I
said, “Now, you know what? You ought to be marching with us.
You’re just as poor as Negroes.” And I said, “You are put in the
position of supporting your oppressor. Because through prejudice
and blindness, you fail to see that the same forces that oppress
Negroes in American society oppress poor white people. And all you
are living on is the satisfaction of your skin being white, and the
drum major instinct of thinking that you are somebody big because
you are white. And you’re so poor you can’t send your children to
school. You ought to be out here marching with every one of us
every time we have a march.”182

King saw what his jailers did not: that they were all “brothers” in
similar circumstances who needed to unite in the struggle for justice
for all.

181. Id. at 10.
182. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., The Drum Major Instinct, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note 176,
at 264. The speech is also available online. Martin Luther King, Jr., The Drum Major Instinct,
Sermon at the Ebenezer Baptist Church of Atlanta (Feb. 4, 1968) (https://kinginstitute.
stanford.edu/king-papers/documents/drum-major-instinct-sermon-delivered-ebenezer-baptistchurch).
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ABA Resolution 112A also recognizes that in America we are all
part of a national community—all in it together—and that if the legal
system is to retain legitimacy, the system must be made to work well
for everyone. In this vein, Resolution 112A presciently notes that “the
perception the courts do not treat poor people fairly has consequences
for the system itself.”183 As California Chief Justice Ronald George
recently observed, “[E]very day the administration of justice is
threatened . . . by the erosion of public confidence caused by lack of
access.”184 Indeed, as King affirmed in his Letter from Birmingham Jail,
“Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”185
That is why in the United States, it is in our national self-interest to
ensure access to liberty and justice for all. This necessity is made more
urgent when we recognize that failure to do so can unleash powerful
centrifugal forces that can rend America asunder. Such destructive
impulses erupt when persons lose hope. And in a global context in
which international competitors or adversaries attempt to disrupt
national elections186 as well as steal the private information of millions
of citizens,187 why would policy makers add to America’s vulnerabilities
by effectively barring the doors of justice to millions? The denial of
access to justice can only have deleterious impacts on America’s
societal stability and progress.
So, the questions are: If not now, when will liberty and justice for
all roll on like waters? And when will the moral revolution—the
paradigm shift in human consciousness needed to effect constructive
societal change—burst forth? The answers lie within each human
breast.

183. ABA Resolution 112A, supra note 6, at 10.
184. Id. (citing Chief Justice Ronald George, State of the Judiciary Speech to California
Legislature, 2001).
185. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Letter from Birmingham Jail, in TESTAMENT OF HOPE, supra note
176, at 290.
186. Robert S. Mueller, III, Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016
Presidential Election, (Mar. 2019), Vol. I at 1.
187. See, e.g., All Things Considered: One Year After OPM Data Breach, What Has the Government
Learned? (Nat’l Pub. Radio broadcast June 6, 2016) (transcript and audio at https://
www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/06/06/480968999/one-year-after-opm-databreach-what-has-the-government-learned). Hackers possibly associated with the Chinese
government were suspected of being involved. Id.

